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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RUDD MARTIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20090814-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Martin constructively possessed methamphetamine. The standard of review when 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial is: "[T]he evidence and the 
reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Solas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 
1991) (quoting State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)). This issue was 
preserved in a motion for directed verdict. R. 294: 145-48. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions are attached hereto in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Rudd Martin appeals from the judgment and sentence of the Honorable Steven L. 
Hansen, Fourth District Court, after he was convicted by a jury of possession or use of 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony.1 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
On December 29, 2007 Rudd Martin was charged by Information filed in Fourth 
District Court with: Count 1 - Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-6-202; Count 2 - Possession or Use of Methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); Count 3 - Theft, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-404; Count 4 -
2 
Criminal Mischief, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
106(2); Count 5 - Violation of No Alcohol Conditional License, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 53-3-232; and Count 6 - Operating or Being in 
Actual Physical Control of a Vehicle without an Ignition Interlock System, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-518.2(3).2 R. 2-1. On 
February 12, 2008 a preliminary hearing was held before Judge Steven L. Hansen and 
Martin was bound over for trial on all charges upon the court's finding of probable cause. 
R. 25-24,289:33. 
On April 29, 2008 Martin filed a Motion to Sever, requesting the following: that 
counts 1 (Burglary), 3 (Theft), and 4 (Criminal Mischief) be tried together; that count 2 
(Possession/Use of Methamphetamine) be tried separately; and that counts 5 (No Alcohol 
I 
Conditional License) and 6 (Ignition Interlock) be tried together. R. 76-69. On August 
18, 2008 Judge Hansen granted the motion to sever. R. 153-50, 199-96. The parties 
subsequently stipulated that count 2 (Methamphetamine) and count 6 (Ignition Interlock) 
would be tried together. R. 294: 109. At trial, the State dismissed count 5 (Alcohol 
Conditional License). R. 294: 113. 
On May 7, 2008 Martin filed a Motion to Suppress pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
1
 Martin was also convicted by the jury of operating a vehicle without an ignition 
interlock system, a class B misdemeanor. He does not challenge that conviction. 
2
 An amended Information was filed on August 29, 2008 which only changed the 
applicable subsection as to Count 4 (Criminal Mischief). 
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Constitution. R. 86-78. An evidentiary hearing was held on the motion on July 29, 2008. 
R. 123-22, 290. On August 18, 2008 Judge Hansen denied the motion. R. 148-45. 
On May 27, 2009 a jury trial was held on count 2 (Possession/Use of 
Methamphetamine) and count 6 (Ignition Interlock) before Judge Hansen. R. 254-52, 
250-49, 248-47, 294. Martin was convicted on both counts. 
On July 14, 2009 the remaining four charges were dismissed on the motion of the 
State. R. 261. 
On August 11, 2009 Martin was sentenced to concurrent terms of 0-5 years on the 
Methamphetamine possession and 180 days on the Ignition Interlock violation. R. 268-
67. 
Martin was granted an extension to file an appeal up to and including September 
14, 2009. R. 274. On September 14, 2009 Martin filed a notice of appeal in Fourth 
District Court. R. 273. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On November 20, 2007 Saratoga Springs Police Officers Edwin Christensen and 
Kevin Turner were dispatched in separate vehicles to do a welfare check on a home at 58 
Aster Way. R. 294: 66, 67, 91. When they arrived at the home, they observed a vehicle 
parked in the area and Martin inside it on the passenger side. R. 294: 67-68, 70, 91. 
There was an odor of alcohol on Martin. R. 294: 68. 
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Upon request, Martin gave the officers his name; and a check was run on his 
driver's license. R. JV-J . ev. f. vlartin had said he had driven the vehicle from Eagle 
Mountain (work v el licle). R 294: 69, 92 I he officers looked i nside the vehr :le ai id ::!.I.cl 
not see an ignition interlock device inside. R. 294: 71, 93. Martin was arrested for an 
interlock ignition restriction. R. 294: 69, 72-73. 
IV lartin w as handci iffed ii I tl le back, searched ai id place d in the backseat (passenger 
side) of Turner's patrol vehicle. R. 294: 74, 75, 94-95. During the search, Christensen 
checked Martin's pockets, waistbands, legs, back and arms. R. 294: 74, 77, 117 
Cl iristensen did i lot find o letl laii lpl letan lii le or dn ig pa .M.-.I nalia oi I N lai th I di tt ing tl le 
search, or in the truck. R. 294: 79, 118. Christensen testified that on a prior search he 
missed finding drugs on a person; and that other officers have had similar experiences. R. 
294: 84. 
Turner testified that he typically searches the back seat oi IL hie V 
the gap between the back seat rest and the seat cushion—for contraband when he comes 
on shift, ana ayum after each prisoner/arrestec »v. . • - >. >- * -i - he performed such a 
search at the beginning < •! his shift on No\ emhor '^- ' • * ' • 
While Turner sat in the front seat of his vehicle and Martin in the backseat, Turner 
looked back and saw Martin leaning forward and fidgeting, even possibly bumping his 
head on the cage that separates the front seats from tl le back seats. R 294: 96 I i lrnei 
testified that Martin was "observed" while he was in the vehicle, either by him looking 
over the cage from the front seat of the vehicle or by another officer watching from 
outside the vehicle through the back window of the car. R. 294: 126. Martin was in 
Turner's vehicle for more than ten minutes. R. 294: 162. 
Some time later Martin was placed in Christensen's vehicle for transport. R. 294: 
96. When Turner opened the door to make this transfer, Martin "had his hands reached 
back around and his... left hand was actually [part way] in his left front pants pocket and 
his change from his pocket had spilled onto the seat and onto the floor of the patrol 
vehicle. And that kind of confirmed my suspicions that he was digging for something to 
hide it or, or still trying to do something." R. 294: 97, 120. Turned asked what Martin 
was doing and Martin did not answer. R. 294: 98. Turner told Martin to stop but he 
continued to move. R. 294: 127. 
Turner pulled Martin out of the vehicle, collected his change, then he "felt and 
searched the back seat of the crack and pulled the base of the seat up to look there as 
well.'5 R. 294: 99. Tucked into the back seat, Turner found a small plastic baggy 
containing a crystal substance. R. 294: 99. The area where he located the baggy was 
hidden from view and "right where [Martin's] hands were when they were handcuffed 
behind his back... in the crack of the cushion." R. 294: 101, 120. Turner believed the 
substance to be methamphetamine. R. 294: 99. No one other than Martin had been in the 
back seat of Turner's patrol car since the last time he searched it. R. 294: 102. 
Turner did not see Martin handle the baggy. R. 294: 119. When Turner held up 
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the baggy after finding it in the seat, Martin said, "that's not mine, you can check me and 
you've already searched me." R. 294: 122, 125. 
294: 135, 136-37. Alisa Farmer, the expert, testified that in regards to examining baggies 
it's "probably more often that I don't find fingerprints than that I do." R 294: 137, 138. 
Ii l this case, she coi lldirt sa;y whetl lei oi i l : t Martii I toi ic! led/hai idled tl i.e baggy. R. 294: 
137-38. The crystal substance in the baggy was also tested by the crime lab and 
methamphetamine was found in the substance. R. 294: 142. 
]\ lartin testified as follo\ v s concerning his arrest: 
[The officers] were talking to me and i u w•
 t 
wants and warrants. It came back with the interlock restriction on it. Iliey 
checked the truck. 1 1 ie> pi it handcuffs c i i me I believe he did read me my 
Miranda rights. 
And then they got me to the car, pulled everything out of my pockets 
and checked my waistband. I he officer made sure that there was nothing, 
• told iheni Ilien: \v;is nullum.' Illi;i( would li.'iiiii Iiiiii No lie |niil his hands in 
my pockets. And then I was sat in the patrol car. 
K. -V4 . •.: Martin was wearing jeans. R, 294: 150. His front left and right pockets, 
where he \i:m eii.tttge *I»H) ;i w 'illcl, nere ^eirehed, \i ,MN I \ I ) Uc -M'llccrs 
subsequently returned the change and wallet to his pockets. He had nothing in his back 
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pockets. R. 294: 151. 
Martin testified that the cuffs were "on tight" and his right wrist, which had been 
broken previously and which has a visible knot, was causing him pain as he sat in the 
back seat of Turner's patrol car with his hands cuffed behind his back. R. 294: 152-53. 
So he tried to change positions to get his wrists comfortable. R. 294: 152. Change was 
falling out of his pocket and when Christensen opened the door to let him out, Martin 
said "there's change, he could see the change up against my fingertips. I said the change 
is falling out. He said that's all right, I'll get it. So I stood up, he got it, put it back in my 
pocket." R. 294: 154. Christensen, while acknowledging that handcuffs are not 
comfortable, testified that the handcuffs were not on too tight and that Martin never 
informed him about the injury to his wrist. R. 294: 160-61. Turner also indicated that 
Martin did not complain or inform him of the pain/injury while they were in his vehicle. 
R. 294: 163. 
When Turner subsequently pulled the baggy out of the seat of his car, Martin was 
shocked. He repeatedly denied the baggy was his and said to the officers, "you can test 
me, you can do anything you want." R. 294: 154, 155. Martin did not know what was in 
the baggy, had not seen it until Turner produced it, but he "knew what it looked like 
and... knew the potential of what that could mean" for him, knew it looked like drugs. R. 
294: 155, 158-59. 
Martin acknowledged telling the officers that he drove to the area in the truck; and 
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that he is an interlock restricted driver. R. 294: 156-57. 
SUMMARY Ol UKJUIMEINT 
Martin asserts that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to establish the 
necessary nexus between him and the drugs to justify his conviction of possession of 
methamphetamine. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MARTIN WAS IN CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION 
OF METHAMPHETAMINE 
Utah I.'"ode , '"Vnnotated § >K-J /-8(2) makes it a third degree felony to knowingly 
and intei itionall} possess or i ise a conti oiled si ibstai ice, ii K li idii ig 1 nethamphetamine. 
Martin asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessed tin 
methamphetamine found in Officer Turner's vehicle as required by Utah law. 
In. review ing tl lis issi le, tl lis Coi u 1: i i n ist \ iew tl le t \ idence and its reasonable 
inferences in the light most favorable to the jury verdict; and this co^  ; - . * -
Martin's conviction for "insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is 
si lfficientlj inconch isive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that [he] comiiiK' • • *f:- f• •• - - ; ., ^ ;cd." 
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State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson, 714 P.2d 
1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)). Furthermore, a "guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based 
solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993). Before a conviction may be upheld, 
"it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as 
charged from which the jury may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980). "Criminal convictions may not be 
based upon conjectures or probabilities." Id. 
Because Martin was not in actual possession of the methamphetamine in this case, 
the State had to prove constructive possession. See Spanish Fork v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 
61, f 7, 975 P.2d 501 (Defendant not present during execution of search warrant on 
residence she shared with husband where drug paraphernalia was found). Constructive 
possession occurs when there is a "nexus between the accused and the drug sufficient 
enough to allow an inference that the accused had both the ability and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the drug." Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at ^ 7. See also 
State in the Interest of MB., 2008 UT App 433, *[ 21, 198 P.3d 1007 ("[Constructive 
possession occurs when 'there is a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the [item] 
to permit a factual inference that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise 
control over the [item]" (quoting State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15, 985 P.2d 911)); and 
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). Moreover, whether a sufficient nexus 
10 
between Martin and the methamphetamine exists depends on the facts and circumstances 
of this case. See, M.B., 2008 UT App 433 at 121; Layman, 1999 UT 79 at f 14. 
While the existence of a sufficient nexus depends on the facts and circumstances 
of this particular case, Utah courts have recognized "several particular evidentiary 
factors" which tend to link an accused with drugs, including: "incriminating statements, 
suspicious or incriminating behavior, sale of drugs, use of drugs, proximity of defendant 
to location of drugs, use of drugs, drugs in plain view, and drugs on defendant's person." 
State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991). See also Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 
at *f\ 8 (Factors include incriminating statements, defendant's presence where drugs found 
in open or plain view, defendant's access and proximity to the drugs, and evidence 
indicating defendant was participating in mutual use/enjoyment of the drugs with others 
(quoting State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Utah 1983)). No single evidentiary 
factor is determinative, rather the evidence must still be examined within the totality of 
the circumstances of each particular case. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at \ 8. 
In two other cases this Court has examined the issue of constructive possession of 
drugs found under the backseat cushion of a car: 
In State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991), an officer received a tip from 
an informant that defendant would be in possession of cocaine during his lunch hour. 
The officer ran a couple computer checks and could not find that defendant had a valid 
driver's license. The officer and another observed defendant leave his work with two 
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other men, and saw them enter a vehicle matching the description given by the informant. 
820 P.2d at 1386-87. Defendant was stopped for driving without a license. During the 
stop, the officer told defendant about the informant's tip and that he wanted to search the 
vehicle for cocaine. The defendant denied having cocaine in the car and consented to the 
search. The defendant remained calm and cooperative. During the search of the vehicle, 
a package containing cocaine was found in the crack of the backseat on the driver's side, 
where the bottom of the cushion fits the back. One of the passengers was sitting in the 
backseat on the passenger side when the car was stopped; and he was observed to make 
furtive movements just before the stop. The cocaine was discovered in a place different 
from where the informant's tip had indicated it would be found. After the cocaine was 
discovered, the defendant made the statement, "they put it there." Defendant was 
convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and he 
appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. 
This Court cited Fox for the proposition that a sufficient nexus is not established 
by mere ownership or occupancy of the place in which the drugs are found—particularly 
where the occupancy is not exclusive. 802 P.2d at 1388. "In order to find that the 
accused was in possession of drugs found in an automobile he was not the sole occupant 
of, and did not have sole access to, there must be other evidence to buttress such an 
inference." Id It is here where the factors listed above come into play on a case-by-case 
basis. Specific to Salas' case, this Court found as follows: While defendant owned the 
12 
vehicle, his ownership and occupancy were not exclusive because his wife also owned 
the car and there were passengers present in the vehicle at the time the drugs were 
discovered. Defendant also "denied the presence of cocaine before the search, denied 
putting the cocaine in the vehicle after it was discovered, arid did not have drugs or drug 
paraphernalia on his person at the time of the arrest." The drugs were also found in an 
area that was not easily accessible to the defendant, and was in fact, much closer to a 
backseat passenger, who had been seen moving around just before the stop. 802 P.2d at 
1389. Based on those facts, in light of the factors established by case law, this Court 
concluded that the evidence was insufficient to create the n^xus necessary to convict the 
defendant of possession of cocaine. Id. 
In State v. Gordon, 2007 UT App 66, an officer stopped a car because the 
registered owner had an outstanding felony drug warrant. As the officer pulled the 
vehicle over, he observed the defendant, who was the backseat passenger on the driver's 
side, making furtive movements and "movements as though he was hiding something." 
After arresting the driver on the warrant, the officer searched the vehicle and found an 
Altoids tin containing crack cocaine hidden in the backseat cushion, close to where 
Gordon was sitting and in the same area where defendant was witnesses making furtive 
movements. Defendant was arrested and initially denied knowing the contents of the tin. 
Later, however, he revealed that he knew the tin contained crack cocaine when he yelled 
to the officer from a holding cell that "it wasn't his crack cocaine in the car." A bench 
13 
trial was held and the defendant was convicted for felony drug possession and 
misdemeanor drug paraphernalia. 
The factors relied upon by this Court in reaching its decision were: One, that 
defendant occupied the specific area of the vehicle where the tin was hidden; and in fact, 
was the closest occupant to the contraband. Two, defendant had been observed making 
furtive movements as if he was hiding something in the exact spot where the drugs were 
located. Three, while the defendant initially claimed to have no knowledge as to the 
substance in the tin, he later made incriminating statements which revealed that he did, in 
fact, know that the tin contained crack cocaine. Ultimately this Court concluded that the 
evidence was sufficient to establish the necessary nexus between defendant and the drugs 
to convict him: "[T]he cumulative effect of these factors is such that a sufficient nexus 
existed between Gordon and the contraband to satisfy the possession element of the 
relevant statutes. See [State v.] Workman, 2005 UT 66 at f35[, 122 P3d 639] (noting 
that taken alone, or even in a small group, such factors would not have established a 
sufficient nexus between a defendant and contraband to infer possession, but the 
cumulative effect of the factors could have caused a reasonable jury to conclude a 
sufficient nexus existed)." 
The facts of this case are both similar and different from Salas and Gordon. As an 
initial matter, Martin did not own the vehicle where the drugs were found; and although 
he was the only occupant of the vehicle's backseat at the time, others had access to that 
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backseat before his arrest. Martin had never been in the vehicle before his arrest, nor did 
he have prior access to the car. Accordingly, "there must bb other evidence" to establish 
the necessary nexus. The only evidence, besides Martin's presence in the backseat 
immediately before the drugs were located were that he was observed by one of the 
officers to be leaning forwards and fidgeting, and that when the officer opened the car 
door, Martin's left hand was part way in his left front pants pocket and change had spilled 
onto the seat and floor. R. 294: 96, 126, 97. Martin also did not answer when asked what 
he was doing but continued to fidget. R. 294: 98, 127. 
However, unlike the passenger in Salas or the defendant in Gordon, Martin had 
been searched by police prior to being placed in the backseat of the car/prior to the 
discovery of the drugs; and like the defendant in Salas, no drugs or paraphernalia had 
been found on his person. Officer Turner had also searched his vehicle at the beginning 
of his shift and testified that nobody had occupied the backspat prior to Martin. While 
the officers testified that they have missed finding drugs on a person while performing a 
search, it has to follow that it is just as likely that Officer Turner missed seeing the drugs 
in his vehicle when he searched it earlier. 
Moreover, like the defendant in Salas, and unlike the defendant in Gordon, Martin 
made no incriminating statements. Instead he repeatedly denied the drugs were his and 
told the officer, "that's not mine, you can check me and you've already searched me." R. 
294: 122, 125. He also requested that they give him a drug test. 
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In addition, the baggy was tested by the Crime Lab and no fingerprints were 
found. While it is true that the examiner testified that it is "probably" more often that she 
doesn't find fingerprints, in this case Martin's hands were cuffed behind his back and to 
get the baggy from his pockets or on his person to between the cracks of the seat, would 
have required that he heavily handle the baggy. In other words, under these facts, it is 
more likely that his fingerprints would have been on the baggy, had he possessed or 
handled it as would have been necessary to convict him here. 
Furthermore, Martin, unlike the backseat passenger in Salas or the defendant in 
Gordon, also had an explanation for his fidgeting. He had a previous injury to his right 
wrist and because the cuffs were on tight, they were causing him pain and he was trying 
to change positions to get his wrists comfortable. R. 294: 152-53. In addition, Martin did 
not avoid being searched by the officers and had been upfront and honest with them 
about driving the car and being an interlock restricted driver. R. 294: 69, 92, 156-57. 
Martin asserts that in this case, under these facts, "the necessary nexus between 
[him] and the [drugs] does not exist... [and] that neither possibilities nor probabilities can 
substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable doubt." Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at % 10. 
Accordingly, he asks that this Court conclude that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish, under a totality of circumstances, the necessary nexus between him and the 
drugs. 
16 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Martin asks that this Court reverse his conviction because the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that he committed the crime of possession or use of 
methamphetamine. 
-th DATED this 16m day of August, 2010. 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
th Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 16m day of August, 2010. 
T^Slc 
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ADDENDA 
18 
Westlaw, 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 5S. Occupations and Professions 
*M Chapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos) 
-• § 58-37-8(2). Prohibited acts-Penalties 
(2) Prohibited acts B-Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in 
the course of the person's professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, 
or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, us-
ing, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for 
a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 
pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and the 
amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a conviction under Subsection 
(l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent convic-
tion the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property occu-
pied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with 
respect to controlled substances as listed in: 
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(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by 
law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by 
law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not amounting to a violation of 
Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the person's body any measurable 
amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury 
as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a 
controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58~37-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is 
guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury or death as a result of the 
person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same 
episode of driving. 
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